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THE IMPACT OF UNION SECURITY IN CANADA
E. E. PALMER*
N the past five years Canadian courts have been besieged with dozens of
cases dealing in effect with the position of -the individual worker in an
industrial society which has accepted the principle of collective bargaining
in its labour relations. This deluge of litigation is indicative of a clear change
in stress in the development of legislative and judicial policy concerning
labour law: up until recent years most effort in these fields was directed toward
an adumbration of the relation between unions and employers; however the
increase in unions' economic strength, the general legislative acceptance of
union security' and various public exposes of union corruption have all led
to this new preoccupation with the position of the individual worker. The
implications of this change are immense and warrant close study.
It seems clear that in Canada two principles have now been accepted as
integral to labor policy on both the provincial and federal level: first, that
unions who command the allegiance of a majority of workers in any unit appro-
priate for collective bargaining may negotiate a collective agreement which
requires all workers in that unit to either become and remain members of or
financially support that union as a condition of continued employment; and,
second, that by certification the union becomes the sole agent to negotiate and
administer the contractual relations 'between management and workers, there
being "no room left for private negotiation between employer and employee."3
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario. Admitted to
practice in Ontario. A.B. 1955, College of William and Mary; MA. 1956, Yale University;
LL.B. 1959, LL.M. 1960, University of Toronto.
1. Most Canadian legislation now permits some form of closed shop provision to be
put in a collective agreement: Dominion Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation
Act, Revised Statutes Canada, c. 152, § 6(1) (1952) [Canadian statutes will be cited
throughout, unless clarity demands otherwise, to the Revised Statutes (R.S.) of the political
entity, e.g., C. (Canada), A. (Alberta), etc., or merely to the section and political entity,
e.g. Alta., § 100.]; Alberta Labour Act, R.S.A. 1955, c. 167, § 80(2); British
Columbia Labour Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 205, § 8; Manitoba Labour Relations
Act, R.S.M. 1954, c. 132, § 6(2); New Brunswick Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.B. 1952,
c. 124, § 5(1); and Ontario Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 202, § 35. In Saskatchewan,
not only can you have union security provisions, but in certain circumstances a modified
maintenance of membership clause must be inserted in the agreement: Trade Union Act,
R.S.S. 1953, c. 259, §§ 8(e), 27. In Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island union security
provisions are possible, however if a person is refused membership by the certified union
the company may then hire him anyway: Newfoundland Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.
1952, c. 258, § 5(1): and Prince Edward Island Industrial Relations Act, Stats. P.E.I. 1962,
c. 18, § 7. Only in Nova Scotia is there legislation prohibiting union security provisions:
Trade Union Act, R.S.N.S. 1954, c. 295, § 4(2) (b). Quebec is at present in the process of
enacting legislation permitting union security: List, Globe & Mail (Toronto), July 5, 1963,
p. B-3.
In the majority of the above legislation check-off clauses are validated: Alta., § 101;
B.C. § 9; Nfld., § 6; N.S., § 67; Ont., § 35(a); and Sask., § 25. Although as yet there is
no legislation relating to check-offs in Quebec, such provisions in collective agreements have
been held to be enforceable: Price Bros. v. Letarte, [1953] Que. Q.B. 307 (CA.)
2. See, e.g., Report of the Industrial Inquiry Commission Concerning Matters Relating
to the Disruption of Shipping on the Great Lakes, the St. Lawrence River System and
Connecting Waters (1963). This is the famed "Norris Report."
3. Syndicate Catholique des Employ~s de Magasins de Quebec, Inc., v. Compagnie
Pquet Ltie, 18 D.L.R.2d 346, 353-59 (Can. Sup. Ct. 1959) (per Judson, J.).
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The necessity to institute such measures in order, in the first case, to relieve
unions from continually expending their energy on organizational activities
and, in the second, to stabilize economic conditions in industry, indicates that
it is unlikely they will be changed. However, when it is noted that these legis-
lative innovations have occurred against the background of a judicial policy
of non-intervention in the internal affairs of unions, including activities relating
to eligibility for and continuing in union membership, it is obvious that a
concomitant body of law is necessary to prevent their improper use by unions.
Thus, at present, despite the traditional antipathy of the trade union movement
to outside intervention in this area,4 courts, administrative agencies and, to a
lesser extent, the legislatures are attempting to fill this gap.
As long as the economic objectives of union security are maintained, trade
unions can claim no inherent sanctity from outside interference in their internal
affairs, such sanctity resting on some vague conception of moral pre-eminence.5
Therefore, there can be no objection to change in this area of the law. The
problem is to develop a system of rules to protect the individual which is
consistent with effective union bargaining power resulting from the various
forms of union security and, at the same time, prevent this reform from merely
becoming a front for anti-union activity.0 It is the purpose of this paper to
examine the extent to which such changes have occurred in Canada, to comment
on their effectiveness and to indicate the possible future course of these
developments.
I. THE RIGHT To JOIN A UNION
Traditionally it has been held that an employee has no legal right to belong
to a trade union since this type of association was analogized to a private club.
7
Thus, in refusing to order the admission of a worker to a union, a common law
court could say, "It would be quite impractical for the courts to undertake to
*4. This point is made most clearly by Professor Kahn-Freund when he says that
one of the chief characteristics of the labour movement is "its aversion to legislative inter-
vention, its disinclination to rely on legal sanctions, its almost passionate belief in the
autonomy of industrial forces." Law and Public Opinion in the Twentieth Century 224
(1959). See also, passim, Graveson, The Status of Trade Unions, 7 J. Pub. Teachers of
Law 121 (1963); Macdonnel, Freedom of Occupational Association and Human Rights,
26 Can. B. Rev. 683 (1948) (where he reproduces various statements made by trade
unionists on this point.)
5. On this point, see Witmer, Civil Liberties and the Trade Union, 50 Yale LJ. 621,
628 (1941).
6. See Friedin, The Public Interest in Labour Dispute Settlement, 12 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 367, 383-85 (1947). See also Ontario Federation of Labour, Submission to the Select
Committee on Labour Relations 15 (1957): "There remain, however, a small number of em-
ployers who refuse as a matter of policy to make dues deductions for their employees
under any circumstances. In such areas we also find a stubborn reluctance of the employers
to accept unions as a permanent institution, and a tendency to try and get rid of unions
whenever the opportunity appears." For an example of the opposite position, see the Board
of Trade of Metro. Toronto, Submission to the Prime Minister of Ont. regarding Amend-
ments to the Labour Relations Act, Jan. 19, 1960.
7. Weinberger v. Inglis, E1919] A.C. 606 (J.L.). See also the Commonwealth cases
collected in Rideout, Protection of the Right to Work. 25 Modern L. Rev. 137, 139 (1962).
See generally Bernhardt, Right to a Job, 30 Cornell L.Q. 292 (1945); Summers, Admission
Policies of Labour Unions, 61 Q.J. Econ. 66 (1946).
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compel men to receive into their social relationships one who was personally
disagreeable, whether for a good or bad reason."8 In the Faramus case9 this
rule was streched to absurdity, when a person was held to have no right to
belong to a union because, contrary to the rules of eligibility of the union, he
had been guilty some twenty-four years earlier of a lesser criminal offence
while still a minor. In a modern, industrial society there seems to be no rational
basis for this rule.10 Some courts, however, have recognized -the necessity of
putting limitations on this hitherto unfettered power." In the United States,
for example, it has been held that where a union tricked employees into desig-
nating them as bargaining agents and then, after negotiating a closed shop,
refused these same men membership and had them expelled from their jobs,
the union was guilty of an unfair labour practice.12 Similarly in New Zealand,
it has been held that a union must not refuse admittance for an improper
motive.13 In England there is also some opinion to the effect that the courts
will intervene by way of declaration or injunction to compel adherence to
union rules and the principles of "natural justice" in the admission of workers
to unions.' 4 Unfortunately, in the United States, once the most fertile ground
for such change, progress in this area seems, at present, to be negligible.' 5
In Canada, however, courts seem to be more aware of the incongruity of
defining unions as purely private associations in an era of collective bargaining
and. hence, have been more favourably inclined to assert their power in aid
of applicants for admission.' 6 Thus, in Guelph v. White and Carron 7 Coady, J.,
held that a former member of a union had a right to have his application heard
by the appropriate committee, even 'though he could not force his way into the
union.18 He also implied that the same was true of anyone who applied for
membership for the first time. The strongest statements, however, were made
in White v. Kuzych' 9 while the case was before the British Columbia courts:
There, in the Court of Appeal, O'Halloran, J. A., stated:
A man has a right to work at his trade. If membership in a
Union is a condition attached to working at his trade, then he has
8. Frank v. National Alliance of Bill Posters, 89 N.J.L. 380, 383, 99 At. 134, 135
(Sup. Ct. 1916) (per Swayze, J.).
9. Faramus v. Film Artistes Assoc., [1963] 1 All E.R. 636 (CA.).
10. Or, to use the words of Professor Summers: "To say that there is no legal right to
join a present-day labour union because membership involves a personal relationship, is
to carry a misconceived precedent to utter absurdity." The Right to Join a Union, 47
Colum. L. Rev. 33, 41 (1947).
11. See, e.g., Denning, L.J., in Lee v. Showmen's Guild of G.B., [1952] 1 All E.R.
1175, 1181 (CA.).
12. Re Monsieur Henri Wines Ltd., 44 N.L.R.B. 1310 (1942).
13. Batt v. Napier W.W.I.U.W., [19342 N.Z.L.R. 993.
14. See Abbott v. Sullivan, [19522 1 All E.R. 226, 238 (CA.) (per Morris, L.J.).
15. Cox, Law and the National Labour Policy, 95 (1960).
16. This has been noted by Rideout, in, The Right to Membership in a Trade Union
15 (1963).
17. [1946] 4 D.L.R. 114 (B.C.S.C.)
18. Cf. Marlin v. Jockey Club of South Africa, [1951] 4 SA.L.R. 638.
19. [1951] 3 D.L.R. 641 (P.C.), reversing, [1950] 4 D.L.R. 187 (B.C.C.A.), [1949]
4 D.L.R. 662 (B.C. Sup. Ct.).
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an indefeasible right to belong to that Union. It must be so, or else
the Union can have no right to agitate for a closed shop. For a
Union to set itself up as the sole arbiter of who shall join the Union
and remain a member, and at the same time decree that no one shall
be employed who does not belong to the Union, is an attempt to exer-
cise totalitarian powers which no constitutional democratic country
claims to have, or has the right to confer upon any Union. Such inter-
ference with individual liberty and coercion of working may be done
under a totalitarian system, but not under any system which takes
its inspiration from the common law.20
Despite its failure to mention such statements, the Privy Council, in
reversing the decisions of the British Columbia Courts, detracted from their
value as aids in controlling union admission policies; however, since appeals
to the Privy Council have now ceased, a resurgence of similar Canadian views
is possible. As has been pointed out,21 the principle that courts should not
intervene in matters of unions' admission requirements "has a stronger ring
of authority than the precedents actually warrant." Thus, a strong court
might be persuaded to imply, as a result of post-war legislation in Canada,
both a public rather than a private status for unions and a reasonable obli-
gation to accept for membership and fairly represent in collective bargaining
all workers who apply and pay dues.22 It is difficult to understand the criticism
that this "would place an undue burden on the judges, who would be placed
in the invidious position of being forced to determine whether a rule governing
admission was reasonable or not"; 23 surely the courts are continually engaged
in the formulation of community standards of this kind, and, further, "a
union's free and autonomous control of its membership ought not to be made
a fetish."1
2 4
Undoubtedly, direct legislative enunciation and protection of rights to
join a union is preferable to a solely common law treatment: indirect exclu-
sionary policies of unions such as exhorbitant fees, too lengthy apprenticeships,
unrealistic competency tests, and so on, would tax the ingenuity of any court.25
In New Zealand, for example, a "reasonable right" of admission has been so
guaranteed; 26 on the other hand, in Canada, little direct legislation has been
20. [19501 4 D.L.R. 187, at 191. See also Sidney Smith, J.A., id. at 201.
21. Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 609
(1959).
22. Cf. the statement of Wilson, J.: "The argument is that the Legislature, having
accepted dosed-shop agreements, intended to protect workmen by requiring Unions to
accept them as members, so that no workman would lose or be refused employment be-
cause of the existence of a closed-shop agreement. But if the Legislature intended to
legislate thus, I would expect to find different wording dearly imposing on Unions the
duty of accepting qualified workmen as members and not merely asserting the right of a
working man to belong to an unspecified union." Gee v. Freeman, 16 D.L.R.2d 65, 77-78
(B.C.S.C. 1959).
23. Note, 79 L.Q. Rev. 163, 166 (1963) (deals with Faramus case (Faramus v. Film
Artistes Assoc., [1963] 1 All E.R. 636 (C.A.))).
24. Wilcox, The Triboro Case-Mountain or Molehill?, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 576 (1943).
25. For a summary of some of these methods, see Summers, supra note 10, at 35.
26. Industrial and Arbitration Act, § 174 (1954).
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enacted. 27 However, in the administration of regulatory controls over certifi-
cation held by labour relations boards a certain degree of regulation has evolved.
Specifically, this control has arisen from the boards' refusal to certify any but
"qualified unions". A union "qualified" to be certified under collective bargain-
ing statutes has been held to be one which, inter alia, may under the terms
of its constitution accept for membership all workers in the unit to be certified.
The Chairman of the Ontario Labour Relations Board has given .the rationale
for this policy in a case where a craft union applied for certification of a plant
in which less than one-half of the employees could be accepted for member-
ship :28 "If we were to certify the applicant on behalf of all employees in the
bargaining unit which we find to be appropriate, we would endow the applicant
with power to enter into a collective agreement with the employer requiring
as a condition of employment that all employees in the bargaining unit hold
membership in the applicant." Thus, fear of unbridled use of union security
has given rise to what has become known as the Gaymer & Oultram rule.
Since many unions do have, at least originally, limitations in their consti-
tutions on the members they may accept-usually based on a craft or religious
basis29-there have been attempts on their part to amend these provisions in
order to obtain certification. To avoid the possibility that these amendments
are mere shams, boards will demand strict adherence to the constitution30
and evidence of sufficiently clear provisions in the union constitution to permit
such change.31 There is also, in borderline cases, a requirement of proof of the
interpretation placed on the union constitution by its members and, even where
27. But see The Fair Employment Practices Act, R.S.O. 1960, ch. 132, § 4. (enacted
in 1951: Stats. Ont. 1951, ch. 24).
28. Professor Finkelman in Re London Assoc. of Painting and Decorating journey-
men and Gaymer and Oultram (London) (1954), 2 Can. Lab. Ser. 76-429 (Ont. Lab. Rel.
Ed.) See also where this principle was applied in Re Ottawa Printing Crafts Union, The
Ottawa Citizen, and the Ottawa Typographical Union, Local 102 (1954), 1 Can. Lab. Ser.
76-431 (Ont. Lab. Rel. Ed.); and Re Int. Molders and Allied Workers Union, Local 360,
and Parkhill Bedding & Furniture Ltd. (1962), 1 C.C.H. Can. Lab. Law Rep. f[ 16,243
(Alta. Bd. Ind. Rel.). Contra, Re Retail Employees Local 832 . . . and Creamette Co. of
Can. Ltd. (1955), 1 Can. Lab. Ser. 60-1047, C.C.H. Lab. Law Transfer Binder (1955-59),
ff 16,023 (Man. Lab. Ed.), cert. granted, 18 W.W.R. (ns.) 250 (Man. Q.B. 1956),on re-
hearing certification granted without reasons, (1956), 1 Can. Lab. Ser. 60-161, C.C.H. Lab.
Law Transfer Binder (1955-59), ff 16,032 (Man. Lab. Ed.).
29. Other situations have arisen, for example, questions of nationality: Re Doll and
Toy Workers Int. Union and Nicky's Plush Toys Mfg. Co. (1962), Ont. Lab. Rel. Ed.
File 2188-61-R, Cf. Re S.I.U. and Hamilton Tug Boat Co. Ltd., (1956) C.C.H. Lab. Law
Transfer Binder (1955-59), f[ 16,054 (Can. Lab. Rel. Ed.). On the other hand, semnbe, mem-
bership in the communist party as a basis for expulsion need not disqualify a union: Re
Retail Store Employees Local Union 832 . . . and Creamette Co. (1956), 1 Can. Lab. Ser.
60-1061; C.C.H. Lab. Law Transfer Binder (1955-59), ff 16,032 (Man. Lab. Ed.).
30. Re I.B.E.W. and B.C. Electric Ry. Co. Ltd. (1953), 1 Can. Lab. Ser. 50-1202
(B.C. Lab. Rel. Ed.), cert. denied, 13 W.W.R. 273 (B.C.S.C. 1954).
31. Re journeymen Stone Cutters of North American (Winnipeg Branch) and Gillis
Quarries (1952), 1 Can. Lab. Ser. 60-1033 (Man. Lab. Ed.). On the interpretation of
union constitutions by labour relations boards, see the comment of MacDonald, J., in
Re Certification of Dist. No. 26, U.M.W.A., 44 M.P.R. 270, 275 (N.S. Sup. Ct. 1960).:
"[A]ny proper reading of Union Constitutions must have regard to the twin-fact that
they are practical documents written for the governance of workmen and their various
units of organization, and couched in language appropriate to the laymen who compose
and manage those units."
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there are widely-framed rules of eligibility for membership, actual discrim-
inatory practices may preclude certification.
32
Recently, however, the courts have indicated a proclivity to limit the
protection afforded to prospective members of unions, this change coming in
the area of religious limitations and specifically relating to continued appli-
cations for certification by the Christian Labour Association of Canada
(C.L.A.C.). The history of this situation stems from an application in 1954 by
the C.L.A.C. which was refused because it limited its membership to Christ-
ians.33 The Board ,buttressed its opinion by quoting sections in the Labour
Relations Act 34 and the Fair Employment Practices Act, 195185 which indicate
a legislative policy against unions discriminating in membership because of
religion. To avoid a similar failure on a later application, 0 the Union did not
change its constitution, but merely had separate, unobjectionable constitutions
for each of its local "affiliates" as well as an ambigious document purporting
to indicate a union interpretation of its constitution which was non-discrimi-
natory. The latter move was an attempt by the union to bring itself within
the Riddell exception 7 whereby statements of policy on admission procedures
by union officers will exclude a strict interpretation by the Board of their
constitutional membership requirements. The Board again rejected the
C.L.A.C.'s application, stating that the two constitutions should be read to-
gether, that there was no evidence that the avowed policy of the C.L.A.C. had
been put into practice, that contradictory testimony existed between the Bosch
& Keuning and the present hearing, and that, in any event, the wording of the
union policy was not clear. In a third attempt, the Tange application, 8 the
C.L.A.C. dropped its credal membership requirements, but still retained
constitutional provisions which permitted the expulsion of members for "rea-
sons based on creed" Following the reasoning in Bosch & Keuning, the appli-
cation was again refused.
It would seem the Board in these applications showed a reticence to
certify due to the unsatisfactory state of the evidence of bona fides brought
by the C.L.A.C.; in other cases where religious unions have applied and indi-
32. See, e.g., Re Sheet Metal Workers' Int. Assoc., Local Union 304, and John E.
Riddell & Son Ltd. (1957), 2 Can Lab. Ser. 76-564, C.C.H. Lab. Law Transfer Binder
(1955-59), if 16,085 (Ont. Lab. Rel. Ed.), where Professor Finkelman distinguishes the
Gaymer and Oultram case, supra note 28, on the basis that in that latter case no evidence
was tendered as to the actual practice followed by the union.
33. Re C.L.A.C. and Bosch and Keuning (Can.) Ltd. (1954), 2 Can. Lab. Ser.
76-445; C.C.H. Lab. Law Transfer Binder (1949-54), if 17,086 (Ont. Lab. Rel. Ed.).
34. R.S.O. 1960, ch. 202 § 34 (amended), then R.S.O. 1950, ch. 194 § 34(b).
35. Stats. Ont. 1951, ch. 24, § 4, now R.S.O. 1960, ch. 132, § 4.
36. Re Concrete Block and Brick Workers' Assoc., aff'd with the C.L.A.C., and
Woodbridge Concrete Products Ltd. (1958), 2 Can. Lab. Ser. 76-589; C.C.H. Lab. Law
Transfer Binder (1955-59), if 16,105 (Ont. Lab. Rel. Ed.).
37. Re Sheet Metal Workers' Int. Ass'n, Local Union 304, and John E. Riddell &
Son Ltd. (1957), 2 Can. Lab. Ser. 76-564, C.C.H Lab. Law Transfer Binder (1955-59),
if 16,085 (Ont. Lab. Rel. Ed.).
38. Re Trenton Const. Workers Assoc., Local 52, aff'd with C.L.A.C., and Tange Co.
Ltd. (1961), 2 Can. Lab. Ser. 76-797; 1 C.C.H. Can. Lab. Law. Rep., if 16,224 (Ont. Lab.
Rel. Ed.).
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cated a clearly non-discriminatory policy, certification has followed.39 Un-
fortunately the Supreme Court of Ontario has quashed this decision by way
of certiorari.40 McRuer, C.J.H.C., indicated two bases for overturning -the
Board's ruling: first, he objected to the use of evidence adduced in earlier
Board hearings with the C.L.A.C. in the instant case, thus paving the way
for the holding that there was no evidence of discrimination upon which the
Board could make a finding adverse to the union; and, second, he found that
legislation used by the Board as a basis for their decision only prohibited
credal discrimination (i.e., religious or doctrinal beliefs), while in the instant
case the sections of the union constitution found objectionable by the Board
merely related to ethical or social principles. Both of these points seem to be
open to question; 4' however, for the time being the position of Board in this
area is unclear. Most probably the Tange case is a unique case insofar as it
relates to interpretation of union constitutions: as stated by the Court,42 the
union constitution "sets a standard of social and ethical behaviour that could
not be objected to by any law-abiding citizen no matter what his creed might
be." Discrimination of a less emotive nature would probably not receive such
a charitable interpretation at the hands of a Canadian court.
In conclusion, Canadian courts at present provide no method for a worker
to force his way into a union. The most effective protection afforded is that
inherent.in the practice of labour relations boards to refuse certification to
unions which practice discrimination in their membership. It must be pointed
out, however, that this protection is limited by the facts that: (i) the indivi-
duals so excluded rarely are able to take advantage of such proceedings because
either they do not know of their existence or there are none pending at the time
of the refusal; and (ii) that such refusal to certify only brings pressure to
bear on a union and does not enforce the membership of the individual. Only
in the Fair Employment Practices Acts 43 enacted throughout Canada is there
a possible method whereby a worker can force his way into a union for, by
39. See, e.g., Re Christian Trade Union of Canada and Harm Schilthuis & Sons (1959)
Ont. Lab. Rel. Bd. file No. 17088-59.
40. Regina v. Ont. Lab. Rel. Bd., ex parte Trenton Construction Workers, Local 52, 39
D.L.R.2d 593 (Cont. H.C.J. 1963).
41. On the second point it is to be noted that members can be expelled for "reasons
based on creed," that meetings were attended by psalm-singing, bible-reading, and so on.
In light of this it is hard to see the rationale for the distinction made.
42. Regina v. Ont. Lab. Rel. Bd., ex parte Trenton Construction Workers, Local 52,
39 D.L.R.2d 593, 607 (Cont. H.C.J. 1963).
43. Fair Employment Practices Acts are almost uniform throughout Canada. See:
Stats. Can. 1952-53, ch. 19, § 4(3)(4): R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 137, § 4; R.S.M. 1954, ch. 81, §
4(3) (4). Stats. N.B. 1956, ch. 9, § 3(3) (4); and Stats. N.S. 1955, ch. 5, § 3(3) (4). Slight
variations may be found in the Ontario Human Rights Code, Stats. Ont. 1961-62, ch. 93,
§ 43; and the Saskatchewan Fair Employment Practices Act, Stats. Sask. 1956, ch. 69,
§ 5. The Dominion Act, which is the prototype of the other statutes, reads: "§ 4(3) No
trade union shall exdude any person from full membership or expel or suspend or other-
wise discriminate against any of its members or discriminate against any person in regard
to his employment by any employer, because of that person's race, national origin, colour
or religion." It is submitted that such clauses at least protect a-member where there is a
union security provision in effect.
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virtue of this legislation, the appropriate Minister of Labour may in his dis-
cretion require a trade union to accept into its membership any person excluded
from that status by reason of his "race, colour, national origin or religion."
44
Again, however, the bases for intervention are narrow and, in fact, there is
no indication whether this legislation has ever been used to provide such dis-
cretionary remedy.
II. REGULATION OF UNION EXPULSION PROCEDURES
Only in the area of unjust expulsion from a trade union have the courts
evolved any coherent and faintly satisfactory system of protection for the
individual worker. No doubt the reason for this has been that it has been easier
for them to analogize from existing legal concepts: accepting the private nature
of a union, it is easier to visualize the rationale for protecting a right which is
in existence than it is to see an obligation on the part of a union to accept a
worker into its membership. Originally, the courts stated that they were inter-
vening to protect the vested right of a member of a union in the association's
property.45 Since this approach was only possible where -the union owned
property and did not take into account the important non-material values
inherent in union membership, it is fortunate that it was rejected in favour
of a contractual basis for intervention. 46 Thus, courts were willing to intervene
to enforce terms of the union constitution, which forms the basis of the con-
tractual relationship between members. Unfortunately, as has been pointed
out,47 -the contract theory "does not, without substantial qualification, guarantee
any real protection for the individual member." An example of this is shown in
the strict adherence to the union constitution in the Faramus case.
48
As a social, as opposed to a legal fact, it is clear that the position of a
member of a union is one based on status rather than contract:49 the position
of the vast majority of prospective union members is that their only choice
is -to join or reject the union; none has the power to bargain for either the
terms upon which he will join the union nor, indeed, his contract of employ-
ment ° which itself introduces a third party into the rights surrounding mem-
44. The Minister also may permit prosecution of the erring union.
45. See, e.g., Rigby v. Connol, 14 Ch. D. 482, 487 (1880) (per Jesse], M. R.). For
an excellent criticism of this approach, see Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,
64 Harv. L. Rev. 1049, 1056-58 (1951).
46. See, e.g., Kuzych v. White, [19501 4. D.L.R. 187 (B.C.C.A.); Stephen v. Stewart
[1944] 1 D.L.R. 305 (B.C.C.A.); and Local 1571, I.A. v. I.L.A. [1951] 3 D.L.R. 50
(N.B.S.C., Ch. Div.).
47. Summers, supra note 45, at 1058. Criticism of the contract theory by a Canadian
writer may be found in Stone, Wrongful Expulsion from Trade Unions: Judicial Inter-
vention at Anglo-American Law, 34 Can. B. Rev. 1111, 1115 (1956).
48. Faramus v. Film Artistes Assoc., [1963] All E.R. 636 (CA.).
49. For an excellent discussion of the development of the basis of union membership
from contract to status, see Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations not for Profit,
43 Harv. L. Rev. 993 (1930).
50. This point is discussed at length by Judson, J., in Syndicate Catbolique des
Employes de Magasins de Quebec, Inc. v. Compagnie PAquet Ltke., 18 D.L.R.2d 346
(Can. S.C. 1959).
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bership, a fact which strengthens the status argument. Unfortunately, if recog-
nized, this societal fact has rarely 5' found expression in the judges' opinions.
However, in Orchard v. Tunney52 which has been called the leading case
indicating a change in judicial attitude in this area,53 there has been an attempt
to introduce this concept in Canada.
In this case Tunney was expelled from the defendant union because he
had claimed one of its officers was stealing union funds, a claim the validity
of which was accepted by the court. At the time Tunney had had resort to
the Manitoba courts he had not completed the final stage of appeal provided
by the union constitution: a tribunal which met every five years in Florida.
The normal approach to this case would be to decide whether Tunney must
first exhaust 'the methods of internal appeal provided by the union constitution
and to which he had "contracted" to abide. While before the Court of Appeal
of Manitoba, however, the following statement, concurred in by the rest of
the court, was made by Tritschler, J: "I cannot myself accept the theory that
the relationship between a member of a Union and his Union is purely con-
tractual. It starts in contract but once created the relationship ripens into
status. The wrongful destruction of this status is a tort."'54
When the case went to the Supreme Court of Canada, Rand, J., repudiated
this "ill-defined" approach in the following words: 55 ... [T]o declare a con-
tractual provision to be an incident of a newly recognized status would be an
unnecessary act of legislation; to extend it to an element beyond the contract
would be to embark upon legislative policy in an unwarranted manner." Despite
this rejection, academics (if not judges) rushed to defend the Manitoba Court
of Appeal; a spate of notes and articles appeared.50 The burden of the argu-
ments advanced was that the pejorative "ill-defined" of Rand, J., should be
really termed "flexible"; 57 the appeal of this ilefinition being heightened be-
cause it would provide protection for prospective as well as expelled members.
Thus, again the plea became one for judicial inventiveness; unfortunately it
has not obtained the judicial recognition it merits and, for the present, contract
remains the basis for intervention at common law.
Due to the courts stressing the contractual element as a basis for inter-
vention in expulsion cases, the rule has been firmly established in Canadian,
51. But see the comments of Hosking, J., in Gould v. Wellington Waterside Workers,
[1927] N.Z.L.R. 1024, where he said that closed shop agreements gave members a
status with respect to such privileged employment, the destruction of which was a tort.
52. [1957] S.C.R. 436, modifying, [1955] 3 D.L.R. 15 (Man. CA.), modifying [1953]
4 D.L.R. 407 (Man. Q.B.).
53. See Cox, supra note 21, at 614; Stone, supra note 47, at 1138.
54. [1955] 3 D.L.R. 15, 39.
55. [1957] S.C.R. 436, 444-45.
56. See, for case comments, the following Notes: Whitmore, 32 Can. B. Rev. 201
(1954); Carrothers, 34 Can. B. Rev. 70 (1956); Whitmore, 34 Can. B. Rev. 83 (1956);
Bennett, 16 U. Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 101 (1958); Crawford & Stone, 36 Can. B. Rev. 97
(1958). Articles of the time, too numerous to note, also dealt with the Tunney case. See
especially those by Whitmore, Stone and Lloyd quoted elsewhere in-this article.
57. See, e.g., Crawford & Stone, supra note 56.
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as well as other common law jurisdictions, that the expelled member must,
before having recourse to the courts, exhaust the internal remedies provided
by the union constitution. The Canadian courts have been aware that since
expulsion from a trade union is tantamount to "industrial death"5 0o an overly
stringent application of this rule is to be avoided. Unfortunately, the Privy
Council in -the important case of White v. Kuzych6 ° has had an inhibiting effect
on the development of a completely clear rule in this area. In this case a mem-
ber of a union who had already been illegally expelled and then reinstated by
the courts, 1 was again expelled by a tribunal of the same union which was
declared by all courts in which the case was heard to be at the very least biased.
Although Kuzych did not attempt to avail himself of the appeal provided by
the union constitution, the British Columbia courts held that this obvious bias
made both the original hearing a nullity and the appeal futile, either of these
latter points being sufficient to exclude the exhaustion of remedies doctrine.
The Privy Council, however, decided that all the original tribunal had to do
was arrive at a "conclusion" which would not be invalidated by the existence
of bias; further, they concluded that there was no proof that the tribunal to
which Kuzych failed to appeal would be biased. Thus, Kuzych lost his case
and it seemed that the Privy Council had indicated that unions would be given
a freer hand in matters of expulsion.
With the cessation of appeals to the Privy Council, Canadian courts have
sought to limit the application of White v. Kuzych as much as possible.0 2 In
this effort, however, they have nearly obliterated traditional legal distinctions
and have failed miserably to clearly define any basic, comprehensible rules.
Since the exhaustion of remedies rule is basically an application of the maxim
pacta sunt servanda to the constitution of an unincorporated association, the
first exception to it is that the hearing provided comply exactly with the terms
of the union constitution; if it does not the action is ultra vires and, hence, a
nullity.68 Engrafted on this is the limitation that the expulsion procedure con-
58. See, e.g., Field v. Court Hope, 26 Gr. 467 (1879); Essery v. Court Pride of the
Dominion, 2 Ont. 596 (1883). For an excellent analysis of this doctrine in Canadian law,
see Stone, supra note 47, 1125-28.
59. The trenchant phrase of Younger, L.J., in Braithwaite v. American Soc. of
Carpenters, 91 L.J. Ch. 55, 68 (1922).
60. [1951] 3 D.L.R. 641 (P.C.), reversing, [1950] 4 D.L.R. 187 (B.C.C.A.), and
[1949] 4 D.L.R. 662 (B.C.S.C.). This case has become a leading authority in this area of
the law, being widely used by common law courts: see, e.g., Tharmallngnam v. Sambathan,
27 M.L.J. 63 (Malayan C.A. 1961); and discussed by writers: e.g., Whitmore, Note, 30
Can. B. Rev. 525 (1952).
61. Kuzych v. Stewart, [1944] 4 D.L.R. 775 (B.C. Sup. Ct.).
62. See Morris J., in Jurak v. Cunningham (No. 1), 20 D.L.R.2d 377, 380 (B.C.
Sup. Ct. 1959): "[T]he tendency of the Courts is, where possible, to avoid extending the
application of the judgment of the Privy Council in White v. Kuzych beyond the narrow
grounds of the facts in that case." For a 'similar view, see Whitmore, Note, 30 Can. B.
Rev. 617, 622 (1952).
63. This exception is based on the traditional iules of ultra vires, as applied to trade
unions in cases such as Murray v. Johnston, 23 R. 981, (Ct. Ses. 1896); Am. Soc. of Ry.
Servants v. Osborne [1910] A. C. 87 (H.L.);' Stanishewski v. Tkachuk, [1955] 4 D.L.R.
517 (Ont. H.C.J.). For its application in the case of a Canadian trade union, see McRae
v. Local 1720, Cargo and Gangway Watchmen's, Union of the Port of St. John, N.B.
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form to the dictates of "natural justice."64 Indeed, on this second heading
there is strong authority that any stipulation in a union constitution that
does not conform to the principles of natural justice will be invalid.65 Both
of the exceptions stem from different, but relatively clearly understood legal
concepts, and together are capable of forming the whole basis of analysis of
court intervention in expulsion cases. Unfortunately, courts are not always
aware of this simple fact. 66
It is important to maintain the distinction between expulsions which are
ultra vires and those which are merely contrary to natural justice for several
reasons. First, if the expulsion is ultra vires the member affected may bring an
action for a declaration immediately, rather than wait to go through the union's
appeal system;6 7 and, second, if the expulsion is ultra vires there is no possi-
bility that the union can cure the defect 68 or that the affected member can
acquiesce in the error6 9 as would be possible in cases resulting from breaches
of natural justice. Both of these results stem from the fact that an ultra vires
act is an absolute nullity. On the other hand, it is more difficult to obtain
damages in ultra vires situations because it would seem necessary to prove
malice; 70 in expulsions tainted by breaches of natural justice this requirement
does not seem to exist, possibly because the very facts of such breach lead
to a conclusion of mala fides on the part of those causing the expulsion.
In essence, then, the problem facing the courts in ultra vires situations is
merely to interpret the union constitution and see whether the acts in question
find actual or implied support there. In this respect cases dealing with non-
business groups have always strictly limited the ambit of their activities. 71
(I.L.A.), [1953) 1 D.L.R. 327 (N.B. Sup. Ct. App. Div.). On this latter case see Whitmore,
supra note 60. For examples of provisions in union constitutions dealing with expulsions
see Clawson, Union Security Clauses and the Right to Work, 30 Can. B. Rev. 37 (1952).
64. See, e.g., Abbott v. Sullivan, [1952] 1 All E.R. 226 (CA.); Hendry, Note, 30
Can. B. Rev. 844, 845 (1952).
65. Lee v. Showmen's Guild of G.B., [1952) 1 All E.R. 1175, 1180 (C.A.) (per Lord
Denning, L.J.). See Whitmore, supra note 60.
66. See, e.g., Morris, J., in Jurak v. Cunningham (No. 1), 20 D.L.R.2d 377, 380
(B.C.S.C. 1959): "A distinction has been made in these cases [Tunney and Bimson v.
Johnson, 10 D.L.R.2d 11 (Ont. H.C.J. 1957), aff'd 12 D.L.R.2d 379 (Ont. C.A. 1958)]
between the facts in the Kuzych case on the one hand where there was not a lack of
jurisdiction, the domestic tribunal having entered upon the hearing the members acting
improperly and showing bias or prejudice, and on the other hand the cases in which the
facts were that the decision was made without jurisdiction at all and the decision com-
plained of was a mere nullity, there having been no charge or proper notice of a hearing
given to the person charged or something of that sort."
67. McRae v. Local 1720, Cargo and Gangway Watchmen's Union of the Port of St.
John, N.B. (I.LA.), [1953] 1 D.L.R. 327 (N.B.S.C., App. Div. But cf., Viscount Simon
in White v. Kuzych [1951] 3 D.L.R. 641, 648 (P.C.), where he states: "[I]s the con-
clusion of a judicial tribunal acting within its jurisdiction, which is arrived at in a way
which amounts to a denial of natural justice, appealable, or on the contrary, is it simply void
and thus not subject to appeal at all?"
68. Ashbury Ry. Carriage and Iron Co. (ltd.) v. Riche, 33 T.L.R. 450 (H.L. 1875).
69. Jurak v. Cunningham (No. 2), 20 D.L.R.2d 381 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1959). See also
Dixon, J., in Austrialian Workers Union v. Bowen (No. 2), 88 C.L.R. 601, 631-32 (Aust.
H.C. 1948).
70. Abbott v. Sullivan, [1952] 1 All E.R. 226 (CA.).
71. The outstanding example of this in Canada is Stanishewski v. Tkachuk, [19551
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The same has generally held true in union cases in Canada, whether they
dealt with membership 72 or the union's legitimate activity.78
The courts, in Canada at least, have been rather unsure of what union
activities should be considered as being in breach of "natural justice" in ex-
pulsion cases. Partly, this has stemmed from the fact that many courts regard
unions as "domestic" tribunals having a greater immunity from review by
way of certiorari than normal "statutory" tribunals. 4 The difference is one
of degree rather than kind, and the courts are not too sure where to draw the
line. It would seem that such a distinction is misleading in that it further
muddies already murky waters and also bears little relation to the reality of
the situation. This distinction, however, may be becoming meaningless as
exemplified by Denning, L.J.'s judgment in Lee v. Shoumien's Guild5 where
he seems to impose limitations of natural justice on union tribunals similar
to those placed on any public tribunal. 76 Indeed, faced with this situation, the
law in this area evolving around statutory tribunals would seem to provide most
adequately for the courts' guidance. 77
The courts are also developing a novel line of protection to the individual
which does not, strictly speaking, belong to either the categories of ultra vires
or natural justice as it relates to limitations'on substantive charges which may
form the basis of expulsion; however, for analytical purposes, it should be
classed under the latter heading, since it has the same consequences. Specifi-
cally, this protection, as set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in S.I.U. v.
Stern,78 is that a union can not legally expel a member because that member
fails to engage in union activities which are themselves illegal, e.g., tortious.
Thus, in the Stern case when the plaintiff was expelled from the union for
failing to follow the defendant union's directives to boycott a hotel which would
4 D.L.R. 517 (Ont. H.C.J.), where Spence, J., applied the ultra vires doctrine to a club
incorporated under the Ontario Corporation Act in face of a Court of Appeal decision which
stated that this rule does not apply in Ontario. The court's reasons are both clear and
laudable: it is more important to restrain the activities of a group whose sole interest in
membership is the furtherance of the interests expressed in the document being interpreted,
than it is in commercial institutions where the overwhelming interest of the membership
is profit no matter how gained.
72. See e.g., Saunders v. Billingsley, [19501 4 D.L.R. 685 (B.C.S.C.).
73. See, e.g., S.I.U. v. Stern, 29 D.L.R.2d 29 (Can. S.C. 1961); affirming, [1960]
Que. A.B. 901.
74. See, e.g., Wilson, J., in Jurak v. Cuningham (No. 3), 21 D.L.R.2d 58, 62 (B.C.
Sup. Ct. 1959): "Thus, these union tribunals are accorded, by contract, a freedom from
supervision by the Courts which is withheld from statutory tribunals, where the sub-
mission of the complainant arises from the social contract to which all citizens must be
held to have subscribed."
75. Lee v. Showmen's Guild of G.B., [1952] 1 All E.R. 1175, 1180 (CA.).
76. For an extra-curial pronouncement indicating a desire to see union activity
relating to union security be closely circumscribed, see the article by this eminent jurist,
A British View of "Right to Work" Laws, U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 16, 1955,
p. 142. This article sheds light on his decisions in the above and other cases involving union
security. See, e.g., Faramus v. Film Artistes Assoc., [1963] 1 All E.R. 636 (C.A.); Boulting
v. A.C.T.A.T., [1963] 1 All E.R. 716 (CA.).
77. See de Smith, Judicial Control of Administrative Action (1959).
78. 29 D.L.R.2d 29 (Can. S.C. 1961).
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not accomodate its members, it was held that the expulsion order be set aside.79
Obviously, this limitation cannot be classed as ultra vires as there is no question
of the capacity of the union to perform -the impugned act;80 rather the act is
one to which the court will give no effect and, therefore, should be subsumed
under the heading of "natural justice." This innovation is of the utmost im-
portance because illegality may arise from statutory inference as well as a
common law basis,8' and so Canadian courts may begin to examine the
legality of all union rules. Indeed, the significance of this case in the whole
field of the relationship between unions, their members and the workers they
represent can hardly be overstressed.
The courts are also broadening the relief available in these cases. For
example, now, although one cannot as against a company obtain interim in-
junctive relief to prevent the enforcement of a union security clause,8 2 such
relief is obtainable against the union if the accused can raise a "fair question"
as to the union's failure to observe the requirements of natural justice; 3 this
second remedy vitiating the effect of the first decision. Declarations and
damages8 4 are also available; the latter remedy, however, has suffered from
the fact that, until recently, such actions had to be against individuals rather
than the union as a whole. At a very early date in union development Professor
Dicey noted that by the act of combination unions "create a body which, by
no fiction of law, but from the very nature of things, differs from the individuals
of whom it is constituted."8 5 Courts, however, continued to characterize unions
as mere groups of people, thus limiting, not only suits by outsiders against
the "union" to actions against the individuals who comprised this group, but
also precluding many suits in damages by irregularly expelled members against
the "union" as an entity. To be sure, in England courts had, at the turn of the
century, attempted to make unions as such liable in damages for illegal strikes; 
79. "It is doubtful that a trade union could attribute to itself the power to coerce, by
threats of suspension of the right to obtain work, its present or future members--who are
virtually forced to maintain union membership to obtain employment-, to boycott third
parties in the exercise of their calling, for reasons and in circumstances such as are present
in this case." Per Fauteux, J., id. at 33-34.
80. On this point, see the comment in LaBrie & Palmer, Cases and Materials on
Company Law 85-87 (1961).
81. See, e.g., the legislation whereby a person cannot be fired by his employer where
union security provisions are in effect and the reason for the employee's expulsion is
"dual-unionism." Cf. Jurak v. Cunningham (No. 3), 21 D.L.R.2d 58 (B.C.S.C. 1959).
82. Brady v. Heinekey and Black Ball Ferries Ltd., 24 D.L.R.2d 737 (B.C.C.A. 1960).
83. Jurak v. Cunningham (No. 1), 20 D.L.R.2d 377 (B.C.S.C. 1959).
84. Kuzych v. Stewart, [19441 4 D.L.R. 775 (B.C.S.C.). In this respect the remedy
has been widened by most courts by not requiring the unjustly expelled member to mitigate
damages, ibid., or giving punitive damages and thus side-stepping the issue: White v.
Kuzych, [1951] 3 D.L.R. 641 (P.C.).
85. Dicey, The Combination Law and Opinion, 17 Harv. L. Rev. 511, 513 (1904).
Recognition of this fact was also shown in a debate in the English House of Commons when
Prime Minister Balfour answered a lawyer in the opposition benches who corrected Bal-
four's use of the word "corporation" in relation to a trade union: "I know; [but] I am
talking English, not law."
86. Taff Vale Ry. Co. v. American Soc. of Ry. Servants, [19011 A.C. 426 (H L.).
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however this change was nipped in the. bud by legislation.87 It was not until the
last decade that English courts made another attempt to attach corporate status
to trade unions.88 Thus, in Bonsor v. Musicians' Union"9 the House of Lords
seemed to accept, at least in part,09 that trade unions are legal entities with rights
and duties which attach to the union as opposed to its members. Canadian courts
have been far bolder in this regard.
Following World War II, arguments in favour of endowing unions with a
quasi-corporate nature found receptive audiences on the bench. Quebec courts
seem to have accepted this doctrine, 91 and, to a limited extent, so did the
courts in British Columbia.92 The Newfoundland Supreme Court even went
so far as to resurrect the Taff Vale caseY3 In 1957, it seemed that the Supreme
Court of Canada had rejected this view in Orchard v. Tunney;94 however, in
1960 this body made it patently clear in the Therien case95 that they regarded
unions as corporate entities. Locke, J., indicated the Court's view of the in-
ference to be drawn from the effect on trade unions given by modern collective
bargaining legislation: 96 "The granting of these rights, powers and immunities
to these unincorporated associations or bodies is quite inconsistent with the
idea that it was not intended that they should be constituted legal entities exer-
cising these powers and enjoying these immunities as such." Other Canadian
courts, unless hampered by direct legislation 97 have quickly made use of the
87. The U.S. Courts have taken a similar position: U.M.W. v. Coronado Coal Co,
259 U.S. 344 (1922).
88. There were some attempts to introduce entity in this area, but they were for the
most part, overlooked. See, e.g., N.U.G. & M.W. v. Gillian, [1946] K.B. 81, 87 (C.A.)
(per Uthwatt, J.)
89. [1955] 3 All E.R. 518 (H.L.); reversing in part, [1954] 1 All E.R. 822 (C.A.).
See Notes: Lloyd, 17 Modern L. Rev. 360 (1954); Montrose, 17 Modern L. Rev. 462
(1954); Cooke, 17 Modern L. Rev. 574 (1954); Thomas, Camb. L.J. 162 (1954); Good-
hard, 70 L.Q. Rev. 322 (1954); Carrothers, 34 Can. B. Rev. 70 (1956). See also the
articles by Lloyd and Wedderburn, infra note 90.
90. In the Court of Appeal Denning, J., was sure on this point: "A trade union is
an entity with a personality in law comparable to that of a corporation. It is not, perhaps,
an entire corporation, but it has many of the attributes of one. . . . I take it to be clear,
however, that a trade union is an entity in fact." Bonsor v. Musician's Union, [1954]
1 All E.R. 822, 836 (CA.). The House of Lords, however, took a far less straight-forward
approach. See the latter's views analysed by Lloyd, Damages for Wrongful Expulsion from a
Trade Union: Bonsor v. Miisician's Union, 19 Modern L. Rev. 121 (1956); Wedderburn,
The Bonsor Affair: A Postscript, 20 Modern L. Rev. 105 (1957).
91. Comtois v. L'Union Locale 1552 des Lambrisseurs de Navires, [1948] Que. K.B.
671 (C.A.). See Spector, Note, 27 Can. B. Rev. 217 (1949), for a comment on this case.
92. See, e.g., In re Patterson and Manaimo Dry Cleaning and Laundry Workers Union,
Loc. No. 1, [1947] 2 W.W.R. 510 (B.C.C.A.).
93. Anglo-Newfoundland Development Co. Ltd. v. Int. Woodworkers of Amer., Local
2-254, 17 D.L.R.2d 766 (Nfld. Sup. Ct. 1959).
94. [1957] S.C.R. 436. This view may well have been ill-founded; fortunately, later
developments rendered it unnecessary to have the Court refine their view on this point.
95. Int. Bro. of Teamsters v. Therien, 22 D.L.R.2d 1 (Can. S.C. 1960), affirming 16
D.L.R.2d 646 (B.C.C.A. 1959), affirming 13 D.L.R.2d 347 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1958).
96. Id. at 11.
97. See, e.g., in relation to unions covered by Ontario legislation: The Rights of
Labour Act, R.S.O. 1960, ch. 354, § 3. Even here, perhaps, this legislation will be whittled
down. Re Polymer Corp., 33 D.L.R.2d 124 (Can. Sup. Ct. (1961), affirming, 28 D.L.R.2d
81 Ont. CA.), afflirming, 26 D.L.R.2d 609 (Ont. H.C.J.). The effect of this legislation is
discussed in Crysler, Actions by or against Trade Unions in Ontario, 39 Can. B. Rev. 30
(1961).
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Therien reasoning to give unions corporate status in both strike9 8 and expul-
sion 9 situations.
The inexorable development of law, not only in common law jurisdictions
but also those of the civil law,100 seems to lead to the recognition that trade
unions are quasi-corporate entities for purposes that relate to their functions
as indicated by appropriate collective bargaining legislation. Canadian courts
have made great strides in this direction, and there is no doubt that in the
near future this concept will be universally accepted. If courts can say that
by usage Indian idols,101 athletic club'02 or credit unions'0 3 are legal entities,
separate from their members, surely there is no problem in drawing appropriate
inferences to the same effect from modern labour legislation. 0 4 Although the
exact limits of this corporate status are vague and difficult to define, one should
not regard this as meaning that change must come through legislation. 0 5 At
present there is a certain amount of legislation in Canada constituting trade
unions as corporate entities;' 0 6 however, no more is needed because courts,
due to their fluid approach, have in this area proved adequate to the task of
fitting union status to societal facts. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that any
legislation would be an adequate substitute or even a complement to the present
situation; such legislation might well inhibit rather than promote develop-
ments in this field.
Besides the above, there is one final line of protection afforded an expelled
union member: the reticence of judicial bodies to enforce union security clauses.
As has been noted,' 0 7 Canadian legislation has generally permitted the inclusion
in collective agreements of clauses which provide for union security. Specifi-
cally this has meant check-off and compulsory union membership provisions.
In dealing -with these legislative and collective agreement provisions courts and
labour relations and arbitration boards have in most cases interpreted them
narrowly in favour of the individual member, thus providing further safeguards
for the individual worker. In those sections dealing with compulsory union
98. Dussessoy's Supermarket St. James Ltd. v. Retail Clerks Union, Loc. 832, 30
D.L.R.2d 50 (Man. Q.B. 1961).
99. Boldt v. S.I.U., 26 D.L.R.2d 441 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1961). This case was followed
in Hughes v. S.I.U., 31 D.L.R.2d 441 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1961) which said that the Boldt and
Therien cases overruled all old cases on entity such as Jurak v. Cunningham (No. 3).
100. For an analysis of this change, see Lloyd, Unincorporated Associations 128-29
(1938).
101. Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kamar Mullick (1925), L.R. 52 Ind.
App. 245 (P.C.).
102. Sylvestre v. Finch, 29 Que. P.R. 226 (Sup. Ct. 1926); The Quebec Amateur
Hockey Association was the group in question.
103. Morrison v. Standard Bldg. Soc. [1932] A.D. 229 (U. of SA. Sup. Ct. App. Div.).
104. For an excellent analysis of these arguments, see Goodhard, The Legal Per-
sonality of a Trade Union, 70 L.Q. Rev. 322 (1954).
105. For arguments in favour of such legislation, see Wedderburn, supra note 90,
at 123.
106. B.C. Trade-Unions Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, ch. 384, § 7; Manitoba Labour Relations
Act, R.S.M. 1954, c. 132, § 46A; The P.E.I. Industrial Relations Act, Stats. P.E.I. 1962,
ch. 18, § 52; and the Quebec Professional Syndicates Act, R.S.Q. 1941, ch. 162, §§ 2, 6,
15, 16, 24.
107. See note 1 supra.
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membership this tendency has been shown most clearly. For example, when
faced with a statement in an earlier case that a union has a legal right in some
circumstances to demand the discharge by a company' 08 of expelled members,
a court refused to grant a mandatory injunction to enforce this right.10 9 Again,
in the Ocean View Development case,i" 0 where a collective agreement stated
that an employee had the "option" of joining the union or paying dues, the
court held the company did not have to fire employees who did neither as such
choice was not a "condition of employment." However in a similar case where
this phrase was added, together with an admonition that any person who
failed to do so should "be subject to discharge,""' the court held that "subject
to discharge" merely meant "prone, open or exposed" to discharge and that,
therefore, the company did not have to discharge employees expelled from
membership by the union. Labour arbitration boards have used similar reason-
ing, stressing that discharging employees was a question of management
rights."i 2 And even labour relations boards, when dealing with companies' re-
fusals to fire as an unfair labour practice, have held that such provisions are
"penal" in nature and, therefore, should be interpreted strictly, i.e., in favour
of the individual worker."i 3
A separate and opposed line of authority does exist whereby courts have
interpreted these provisions free of any canon of construction favouring the
individual."i 4 Similarly, many arbitration boards have given the obvious mean-
ing to membership clauses that their breach entails an obligation on the part
of the company to discharge the employee in question." 5 Where a collective
agreement contains such a membership provision" and the board is willing
to accept this latter view there are still some limitations placed on companies'
duties in these cases." i7 It has been held that an expulsion, to effectively
108. Wilson, J., in Jurak v. Cunningham (No. 3), 21 D.L.R.2d 58 (B.C.S.C. 1959).
109. McLaughlin v. Westward Shipping Ltd., 21 D.L.R.2d 770 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1959).
It would, however, grant a negative injunction to prevent the company from hiring non-
union labour.
110. Bldg. and General Labourers' Union, Local No. 602 v. Ocean View Development
Co., [19551 5 D.L.R. 12 (B.C. Sup. Ct.)
111. Michael v. Parkinson Bldg. Supplies Ltd., 38 W.W.R. (n.s.) 563 (B.C. County
Ct. 1962).
112. See, e.g., Re Brewery Workers, Local 232, and Brading's Brewery Ltd., 6 Lab.
Arb. Cas. 341 (1956) (see, especially, the dissent).
113. See, e.g., Re Construction and General Labourers' Union, Local 890, and Early
Seed and Feed Ltd. (1950), 2 Can. Lab. Ser. 85-1021 (Sask. Lab. ReL. Bd.).
114. See, e.g., Rex ex rel., Bender v. Piggott, 89 Can. C.C. 360 (Sask. Pol. Ct. 1947);
and Corbett v. Can. Nat. Printing Trades Union, [1943) 4 D.L.R. 441 (Alta. C.A.), re-
versing, [1942) 2 D.L.R. 762 (Alta. Sup. Ct.).
115. The leading award on this point is Re Toronto Printing Pressmen and Assistants'
Union No. 10 and Northern Minor Press Ltd., 8 Lab. Arb. Cas. 251 (1958). See also, for
an example of this liberal method of interpretations, Re New Toronto Brass and Copper
Workers Union, Local 811, and Anaconda American Brass Ltd., 1 Lab. Arb. Cas. 100
(1947).
116. It seems clear than in the absence of such a provision a company need not dis-
charge an employee: Re United Steelworkers, Local 2871, and Joy Mfg. Co., 6 Lab, Arb.
Cas. 149 (1955).
117. For a r~sum6 of the position in the U.S., where this area has been the subject of
wider analysis, see Summers, supra note 45, at 1099-1100.
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trigger the union security clause, must conform both to the union constitution
and by-laws and to the provisions in the collective agreement. Thus, the union
must, when asking for the discharge, at least present the company with a
copy of the union constitution, related documents, and the reason for the
expulsion.11 If the company does not require the union to do so in order that
it may satisfy itself as to the legality of the expulsion as shown on the face of
these documents, when it subsequently discharges the employee, even if in
good faith, it is left open to prosecution for an unfair labour practice or an
adverse arbitration award.
1 9
When dealing with check-off provisions, probably because they do not
entail loss of employment to the same extent as membership clauses, judicial
and quasi-judicial bodies have not been as reluctant to give a wide reading to
the legislative and negotiated provisions with which they -have been faced.1
20
For example, if the agreement says the check-off is irrevocable, 12  arbitration
boards have demanded strict adherence to any provision permitting employees
to withdraw their authorization for such check-off. 22 In total, however, the
cases, even those relating to check-off disputes, still seem to indicate a pre-
disposition on the part of the courts to accept interpretations favourable to
the individual worker. Thus, the courts exhibit a tendency to limit the use of
union security provisions; but this provides scant protection when there is, as
has been pointed out, little control over the substance of the provisions them-
selves.
Opinions vary on whether or not judicial protection in expulsion cases
is satisfactory. Some proponents of the status quo argue that the courts offer
sufficient protection to make unions adhere to their constitution, forgetting
that the rules themselves may be at the root of the trouble. 123 Others stress
the fact that the present situation fosters "independent self-government" as
118. Re Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Orenda Engines Ltd., 8 Lab. Arb. Cas. 116
(1958).
119. Re Intl Ass'n of Machinists, Lodge 1246, and Franklin Mfg. Co. Ltd., 12 Labr.
Arb. Cas. 327 (1962).
120. See, e.g., Re Teamsters Union, Local 880, and Charlton Transport Ltd., 13 Lab.
Arb. Cas. 59 (1962) (extends obligation of company to check-off to periods when member
sick or laid-off); Re National Union of Public Employees, Local 504, and City of Peter-
borough, 10 Lab. Arb. Cas. 328 (1960) (extends to persons hired by municipality for
winter works programme but paid by federal government's moneys). Cf. Regina v. Lab.
Rel. Bd. Sask., exp. Army & Navy Dept. Store Ltd., 34 D.L.R.2d 149 (Sask. CA. 1962).
121. Unless the collective agreement says the check-off is irrevocable, employees may
revoke their authorization at any time: Re I.U.O.E., Locals 796 and 944 and H.E.P.C. of
Ont., 11 Lab. Arb. Cas. 310 (1961).
122. See, e.g., Re United Steelworkers, Local 4906, and Timken Roller Bearing Co.,
10 Lab. Arb. Cas. 3 (1959); Re U.A.W. and Sperry Gyroscope, 8 Lab. Arb. Cas. 215
(1957). Cf. McKinnon v. Dom. Coal Co. Ltd., 5 D.L.R.2d 481 (N.S.S.C. 1956), aff'd sub
nom U.M.W. of A., Dist. 26 v. McKinnon, 8 D.L.R.2d 217 (N.S.C.A. 1957); 12 D.L.R.2d
449 (Can. Sup. Ct. 1958;. See also Re United ... Rubber Workers of Am., Local 189, and
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. of Can., Ltd., 1 Lab. Arb. Cas. 12 (1947).
123. Thomas, Trade Unions and Their Members, 1956 Camb. L.J. 67, 69, where he
states: "[Tlhe successful plaintiff may well find in them [judicial rules] all the remedy
he needs; for these should speedily restore him to the enjoyment of his membership, at
any rate until the union, through its proper agencies and for proper reasons, chooses to
expel him in strict accordance with the rules."
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it develops "responsibility" on the part of the unions.124 The argument is also
made that to place this responsibility with labour relations boards would compro-
mise the boards' position as impartial arbiters of unions and management.12
On the other hand, critics of the present situation argue that emphasis on the
contractual relations between the union and its members necessarily limits the
flexibility of approach needed in this area . 26 Similarly, criticisms applicable
to all legal proceedings are made: it is long, expensive, and judgment is diffi-
cult to obtain.1
27
Upon examination, the real problem in evaluating present expulsion pro-
cedures is whether the union itself should continue to be the sole judge of the
propriety of the substantive rules forming the hasis of union membership. If so,
the above analysis seems to indicate that the procedural aspect of expulsions
is closely protected in favour of the individual; if not, the above protection
merely provides temporary safeguards, easily circumvented by unions. Clearly,
the latter position seems untenable and thus the Stern doctrine becomes of
supreme importance in this area of law. However this development which has
been much hoped for in some quarters, 12 raises the question whether Canadian
judges are temperamentally suited for this role or whether labour relations
boards would not be more suitable forums in these cases. Again, no matter
which of these agencies is chosen, the question remains as to the basis for
intervention in a union's choice of membership rules, assuming their initial
determination is to be left to the union concerned.
III. PROTECTION OF THE "QUALITY" OF UNION MEIBERSHIP
Of at least equal importance with the topics discussed above is the pro-
tection afforded a union member in the day-to-day working of collective
bargaining, or what might be called the quality of union membership. Until
recently this aspect of labour law has remained largely unexamined in Canada;
however, due to the belated realization that denial of certain basic rights will
undermine not only the democratic nature of a union but also the obvious
legislative objective of industrial peace, moves are afoot to remedy this situation.
Specifically, there have emerged three areas where changes are taking place in
this connection: the individual's right to fair representation in collective bargain-
124. Cox, supra note 21, at 615; Aaron & Komaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal
Union Affairs, 44 Ill. L. Rev. 425, 631, 667-68 (1949).
125. Ibid.
126. Lloyd, Judicial Review of Expulsion by a Domestic Tribunal, 1 Modern L.
Rev. 412 (1952).
127. Summers, supra note 45.
128. Lloyd, Note, 36 Can. B. Rev. 83, 95 (1958):
Nor is the possibility of legislative intervention a decisive substitute for judicial
development; for not only may the legislature be preoccupied with other more
pressing affairs but the subject-matter itself may be unsuitable for statutory
treatment. It is particularly in such a field as the present, where legislation is
improbable but if enacted is likely, by an over-rigid approach, to do more harm
than good, that the development of the common law may prove the most suitable
means of reaching a satisfactory solution.
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ing, the extent to which he has an effective voice in union affairs, and his right to
hold views divergent from others in the union.
In the United States it seems clear that the courts and various boards
dealing with labour matters have accepted the principle that the right to
exclusive representation in collective bargaining enjoyed by unions necessitates
a correlative duty of fair representation of the individual worker's interests, 129
both in the negotiation 3" and administration 13 1 of the collective agreement.
Thus, for example, where such discriminatory union policies are found, the
certification of the union may be revoked. 1 32 In Canada, authority for a similar
proposition is lacking, although Boards, using their discretion as to what consti-
tutes a "qualified" union, might be willing to decertify any union which en-
gages in such discriminatory activities. Members, however, are not without
protection. Thus, as has been shown, to the extent that union activity affecting
a member finds no support in the union constitution it may be declared ultra
vires. Upon proper evidence the common law action for conspiracy may also
provide protection for the individual worker, as it did in Boldt v. S.I.U.1
33
where the British Columbia Court of Appeal -found that the plaintiff had been
excluded from the union hiring hall as a result of a conspiracy on the part of
the union executive. Again, statements such as that by Sidney Smith, J.A.,134
that: "One might ... speculate whether the statutory privilege of a Union to
contract with employers on behalf of its members has not added a fiduciary
aspect to their relationship," indicates that the courts are willing to entertain
ideas similar to those in this field in the United States.
In this area the courts seem to be reacting against the possibility of abuses
of union security. Thus, in a recent case, Re Grottoli,13 5 the highly respected
129. See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). It has been said of
this case that: "The Steele Doctrine has in effect created a nation wide fair-employment-
practices act wherever there is collective bargaining." Blumrosen, Union-Management
Agreements Which Harm Others, 10 J. Pub. L. 345, 359 (1961). One of the main bases of this
doctrine is the fact that the union bargains for all employees in a bargaining unit whether
union members or not. Thus, it is interesting to note that in Sweden, where the union only
bargains for its members, this doctrine is far less developed: Summers, Collective Power
and Individual Rights in the Collective Agreement--A Comparison of Swedish and American
Law, 72 Yale LJ. 421, 423, 432 (1963).
130. See the analysis of the U.S. position collected in Hanslowe, Labour Law and the
Public Interest, 11 J. Pub. L. 27, 36-37 (1962).
131. Cases in the U.S. are set out and analyzed in Summers, Individual Rights in
Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 59, 362 (1962).
132. The position of the Board in respect to this safeguard has not always been above
criticism. See Aaron & Komaroff, supra note 124, at 440.
133. See note 100 supra. In a case involving similar facts, Hosking, J., stated in
Gould v. Wellington Waterside Workers, [1927] N.Z.L.R. 1024: "So far, however,
as the acts of the defendant consisted in preventing the plaintiffs from obtaining
employment, I think the defendant's conduct amounts to a tort. It was something beyond
the breach of the rules. The plaintiffs possessed a status with regard to the right of prefer-
ential employment, not dependent upon the rules but upon the industrial agreement, and
created not merely by the consent of the union but by correlative consent on the part of
the employees to restrict their areas of choice of employees."
134. White v. Kuzych [1950] 4 D.L.R. 187, 201 (B.C.C.A.). See also Martland, J.,
in Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 16-601, v. The Imperial
Oil Co. Ltd., 41 D.L.R.2d 1, 11 (Can. Sup. Ct. 1963).
135. Re Grottoli v. Lock & Son Ltd., 39 D.L.R.2d 128 (Ont. H.CJ. 1963).
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McRuer, CJ.H.C., permitted an employee to by-pass the arbitration provisions
of a collective agreement and take his grievance directly to the courts. The
significance of this holding is shown by the fact that it was made in the face
of legislation which states that: "Every collective agreement shall provide
for the final and binding settlement [on inter alia, the employer and employee]
by arbitration ... of all differences between the parties arising from the inter-
pretation, application, administration or alleged violation of the agreement
.... '186 Although there was no mention in the case of any refusal on the part
of the union to process this grievance, McRuer, C.J.H.C., gave as the gravamen
of his decision the reason that for the Court to refuse jurisdiction: "would put
in the hands of a union that has been certified as collective bargaining agent
extraordinary power over non-members of the union who were employees of
the same employer. The union could see fit to assert the claims of the members
of the union but not assert the claims of non-members of the union."ler7 He
continued that in view of the foregoing the legislation could not be interpreted
as giving sole jurisdiction to a board of arbitration. This case, which is now
on appeal, would seem to be too wide in its statement and potentially disruptive
of the stable administration of collective agreements. Perhaps the wiser course
in this area would be to take into account the fact that individuals are being
given freer access to the arbitral function by the judicial formulation of rules
to this effect' 8 8 and, therefore, by stressing the reasoning of Sidney Smith, J.A.,
set out above limit the Grottoli rule to situations where there has been a
flagrant refusal of the union to present an individual's grievance.
At present, the area where there is the greatest amount of activity in
relation to the quality of union membership is that relating to the control of
union policies. On the one hand, this activity is evidenced by measures to ensure
that the individual can have an effective voice in union affairs and, on the
other, by measures to limit the areas where union policies themselves can
legally be affected: both types stemming -from a roughly-defined view of "demo-
cratic rights" to which unions must adhere.
Of the two approaches, measures to ensure that a member has an effective
voice in union affairs has received the least coverage. In the case of elections
for union posts or votes to determine union policies the courts, by virtue of
their views on idtra vires outlined above, will demand close adherence to rele-
vant constitutional provisions. Unfortunately, the courts have no control over
the content of the rules except to imply certain requirements of notice.'89 To
remedy this certain jurisdictions have made strike votes with secret balloting
compulsory, although little else has been done.140 Thus, Canadian courts have
136. Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 202, § 34(1).
137. Re Grottoli v. Lock & Son Ltd., 39 D.L.R.2d 128, 129-30 (Ont. H.C.J. 1963).
138. See, e.g., Reville, The Individual Employee's Right to Process his own Grievance
to Arbitration, paper given at the Univ. of Toronto School of Business Conference on
Arbitration, Fri., Oct. 18, 1963.
139. See, e.g., Faulds v. Hesford, 10 D.R.L.2d 292 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1957).
140. See, on this topic, Anton, Government Supervised Strike Votes (1961), which
discusses in an excellent manner the position of strike votes in Canada.
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yet to adumbrate their policy on the common law attitude towards a union
member's right to free speech in his union's affairs. It is to be hoped that when
the opportunity arises they will follow the words of Fuld, J., in Madden v.
Atkins:
If there be any public policy touching the government of labour
unions, and there can be no doubt that there is, it is that traditionally
democratic means of improving their union may be freely availed of
by members without fear of harm or penalty. And this necessarily
includes the right to criticize current union leadership and, within
the union, to oppose such leadership and its policies. . . The price
of free expression and of political opposition within a union cannot
be the risk of expulsion or other disciplinary action. In the final anal-
ysis, a labour union profits, as does any democratic body, more by
permitting free expression and -free political opposition than it may
ever lose from any disunity that it may thus evidence.141
The most common method of protecting the quality of union membership
seems to be to limit the ambit of legal union objectives, specifically in the
area of dual-unionism and political support. Thus, in most legislation providing
for union security, provision is also made that "No provision in a collective
agreement requiring an employer to discharge an employee because such em-
ployee is or continues to be a member of, or engages in activities on behalf
of a union other than a specified trade union, is valid."'1 42 It has been held
that dismissals for dual-unionism, which are done as a result of voluntary
company action and absent a union security pro-Zision in the collective agree-
ment, do not come within the scope of the above legislation; 143 however, it is
clear that there is a governmental, if not judicial, policy to permit workers to
join any union they wish without fear of reprisal. Obviously, when union
security is a legitimate object of union activity, dual-unionism or other method
of providing for replacement of the incumbent union is a necessity unless it is
desired to establish a union representative who need not be responsive to
workers' demands.
The problem of unions engaging in political activity is also an area where
141. 4 N.Y.2d 283, 293, 151 N.E.2d 73, 78, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633, 640 (1958).
142. Dominion Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1952, ch.
152 § 6(2). See also, for similar legislation: Manitoba Labour Relations Act, R.S.M. 1954,
ch. 132, § 6(2); New Brunswick Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.B. 1952, ch. 124, § 5(2);
Newfoundland Labour Relations Act, R.S.N. 1952, ch. 258, § 5(2); Nova Scotia Trade
Union Act, R.S.N.S. 1954, ch. 295, § 6; Ontario Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1960, ch. 202,
§ 35 (2), (3); Prince Edward Island Industrial Relations Act, Stats. P.E.I. 1962, ch. 18.
143. Jurak v. Cunningham (No. 3), 21 D.L.R.2d 58, 63 (B.C.S.C. 1959), where
Wilson, J., stated "It will be noted that the men have been discharged because of their
allegiance to another union and the presumed intention of § 6(2) thereby, is perhaps,
defeated. But statutory interpretations on the right to contract are to be strictly interpreted,
and, even if the result may appear to indicate the use of some methods to evade the con-
sequence of a provision, the method used does not thereby necessarily become illegal."
This case also points out that protection of individual employees must start with the
realization that many employers wish to only deal with unions and that merely to permit
the individual worker to by-pass the union and deal directly with his employer is an illusory
protection. On this point see Blumrosen, supra note 129, at 347; Howlett, Contract Rights
of Individual Employees as against the Employer, 8 Lab. L.J. 316, 318 (1957).
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limitations have been placed on unions in Canada. As a first limitation, it is
clear that a union can not give money to a political party unless it is clearly
authorized to do so by its constitution. 144 Also in British Columbia recent
legislation has provided that no money received by unions through a check-off
or as a condition of membership can, directly or indirectly, be expended for
political purposes. 145 This limitation on union activity has been held to be
intra vires the Province of British Columbia under the B.N.A. Act by the
Supreme Court of Canada.146 The gravamen of the majority there was founded
on the questionable assumption that unions in British Columbia are basically
creatures of legislation and, hence, if the Province has created the capacity to
gather funds it can also limit such powers. While before the provincial courts,
these bodies were impressed by the argument that an individual should have
the right to support the political party of his choice; indeed, Tysoe, J.A., went
so far as to say that it is against public policy for the courts to permit the
individual to delegate this right. 147 The obvious rebuttal to this point has
already been made by Frankfurter, J.: [T]he law regards a union as a self-
contained, legal personality exercising rights and subject to responsibilities
wholly distinct from its individual members. . . .It is a common place of all
organizations that a minority of a legally recognized group may at times see
an organization's funds used for promotion of ideas opposed by the minority.148
From the point of view of certain individual workers there is no doubt
that they would benefit from not having to pay money to one political party
while supporting another in a necessarily reduced financial manner. It is to be
remembered, however, that unions can not remain politically neutral: the only
way in which unions have progressed against a traditionally antipathetical
legal system which, for example, has produced the conspiracy suit and the
injunction judge has been through direct political action. 149 Thus, it would
seem that, even in a member's own interest, the British Columbia legislation
goes too far. Accepting this, however, a middle course must be found between
the proponents of complete abstention by unions from political activity6" and
those who would permit unions to coerce members into not only financially
supporting certain political parties, but also personally adhering to that party's
144. American Soc. of Ry. Servants v. Osborne [19101 A.C. 87 (H.L.). For a recent
application of this case, see True v. Australian Coal and Shale Employees Fed., 51 W.
Aust. L.R. 73 (1949).
145. British Columbia Labour Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, ch. 205, § 6, as amended
Stats. B.C. 1961, ch. 31, § 5.
146. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local No. 16-601 v, Imperial
Oil, 41 D.L.R.2d 1 (Can. S.C. 1963) affirming, 33 D.L.R.2d 732 (B.C.C.A. 1962), 30 D.L.R.2d
657 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1961).
147. 33 D.L.R.2d 732, at 741.
148. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 808 (1961).
149. For a discussion of this point see Fillenworth, Politics and Labor Unions, 37
Notre Dame Law. 172 (1962); Reynolds, Labour Economics and Labour Relations 80-81
(1959).
150. See, e.g., Board Member (and, typically, company nominee) Lapham in Re
Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. and U.S.W., 10 Lab. Rel. Rep. 888 (1942).
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programme.' 5 ' Perhaps the apparent position in Australia15 2 and the United
States 153 that a member can not be forced to follow a specific political line,
but has no right to control union funds expended for political purposes if such
purposes are intra vires, would be the happiest solution.
Another important development in this area is the imposition of a govern-
ment trusteeship on certain maritime unions,' 54 largely lBecause of undeniable
abuses of union power against individual workers. Despite the obvious neces-
sity to alleviate the intolerable position in which these -workers and, indeed,
the industry found itself, it can be questioned whether this was a wise move
for, in effect, all that has been accomplished is a replacement of certain able,
-hard-bargaining, but unscrupulous, labour bosses by honest trustees who have
yet to prove their ability to adequately represent the economic demands of the
union as a whole. In short, this development is potentially disturbing for it
may well prove to be a gain in terms of extensions of the individual worker's
freedom in the day-to-day activities of the union which has been achieved at
the cost of the incommensurate loss in union bargaining power, a trend which
is visible in most of the innovations -mentioned above. Indeed, in this area, it
might well be asked whether the total gains so -far achieved outweigh the costs.
CONCLUSIONS
Several years ago, if one were to comment on the development of pro-
tections for the individual worker, it would have been possible to be cautiously
optimistic: administrative boards were evolving a sensible theory of "qualified"
unions, courts were cautiously moving towards an adumbration of the incidents
of the "status" of workers in a unionized economy, and, albeit slowly, legis-
lation of general application was being passed which dealt with the problems
of dual-unionism and obvious forms of discrimination in membership by unions.
Although these developments were too few, they did possess the virtue that
they did not severly impinge on the bargaining power of the union movement;
indeed, by stimulating freedom in the rank and file, it could be argued that
they strengthened it.
151. "The advancement of economic democracy ... may call for action on the political
front. Trade union discipline may call, at least sometimes, for adherence to a political
program. A departure from this program at the polls may be as serious an offense as is
crossing a picket line. Shall the courts forbid punishment of the offender?" Witmer, supra
note 5, at 629.
152. See Foenander, Trade Union Rules and the "Political Levy"--Australia, 10 U.
Toronto L.J. 73, (1953).
153. See Aaron & Komaroff, supra note 124. It is to be noted, however, that the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act § 313, 61 Stat. 159-60 (1947) 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1958) prohibits
unions and companies from contributing to presidential and vice-presidential political
campaigns. This provision has limited union political activity to only a slight degree as
courts have held that it applies to only direct financial contributions. See Senate Subcomm.
on Privileges and Elections, Interim Report of 1956 Presidential and Senatorial Campaigns
Studies, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1956). If it has had little effect on unions it has had
none on corporations for, interestingly, none have been indicted under this section. Id.
at 19-20.
154. The Maritime Transportation Unions Trustees Act, Stats. Can. 1963, ch. 17.
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Today, however, there is cause for serious concern regarding recent inno-
vations in this area. Largely as a result of recent public revulsion at the treat-
ment of individual union members by some unprincipled labour leaders a
climate conducive to change has been created. Thus, proponents of change
have found a ready and largely uncritical body of supporters. Unfortunately,
in some cases this situation has been used to severely cripple union power as
such in the guise of protecting the rights of the individual member. The
British Columbia legislation on political contributions'" seems to be a clear
example of this trend. On another level, efforts of courts to afford additional
protection to individual workers seem to pose a potential hazard to the proper
development of the law in this area. For example, Re Grottoli5 ° goes further
than was needed to protect the individual deprived of access to the arbitral
process and the Tange case' 51 seems to be incompatible with a sound adminis-
trative policy protecting the individual. Again, when one recalls that a Canadian
judge has recently stated that modern labour legislation has permitted unions
"to put a gun to the head of management," 58 one may legitimately have
misgivings as to the future application of SJ.U. v. Stern.15 Indeed, at the
present time it may safely be predicted that any further change instigated
by courts or legislatures in the near future will hardly be anything but anti-
labour.
155. See notes 146 and 147 supra.
156. British Columbia Labour Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 205, § 6, as amended,
Stats. B.C. 1961, c. 31, § 5.
157. Regina v. Ont. Lab. Bd., ex parte Trenton Construction Workers, Local 52,
39 D.L.R.2d 593 (Cont. H.CJ. 1963).
158. See Manson, J., in MacMillan & Bloedel (Alberni) Ltd., v. United Assn. of
journeymen . . . of Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry, Local 170, 26 W.W.R. (n.s.) 276,
277 (B.C.S.C. 1958).
159. 29 D.L.R.2d 29 (Can. S.C. 1960).
